Cyber security white elephant. You are doing it wrong.

The top cause of information security weakness is terrible user experience design. The second cause of information security vulnerability is the fallacy of information security. A system designed by people will eventually be defeated by another system designed by people. This short essay is just a reminder, perhaps to myself as well, that if certain undesired issues don’t appear to be going away, we may not be approaching them the right way.

The top cause of information security weakness is terrible user experience design. The second cause of information security vulnerability is the fallacy of information security. Everything else flows from there.

It happened again, a high profile IT system was hacked and the wrong information was made available to the wrong people in the wrong places at the wrong time. This is the opposite of what information security infrastructure is defined as. Just search the Internet for “Sony hack”, one of the top hits is an article from 2011 that reads as Sony Hacked Again; 25 Million Entertainment Users’ Info at Risk

This type of headline news always beg some questions:

Don’t we know that any information system can eventually be breached given the right amount of resources (resource includes any amount and combination of: motivation, hardware, people, skills, money, time, etc) ?

Is it really so that deep pocketed companies cannot afford to protect their valuable resources a little harder than they appear to be doing?

Do we really believe that hackers wait to be told about potential vulnerabilities before they would attempt to break in? Can we possibly be that naive?

This has happened many times before to many large companies. Realistically, this will continue to happen. A system designed by people will eventually be defeated by another system designed by people. Whether the same would hold true for machine designed systems versus people designed systems is an undetermined problem. Once machines can design themselves totally independent of any human action, perhaps then information security will take new shape and life. But that might just be what professor Steven Hawkins was on about recently?

I suggest that we stop pretending that we can make totally secure systems. We have proven that we can’t. If however, we accept the fallibility of our designs and would take proactive actions to prepare, practice drills and fine tune failure remediation strategies, then we can start getting places. This is not news either, people have been doing that for millennia in various capacities and organisations, war games and military drills are obvious examples. We couldn’t be thinking that IT would be exempt of such proven practices, could we?

We may be too often busy keeping up appearances, rather than doing truly useful things. There is way too much distraction around, too many buzzwords and trends to catch up with, too much money to be thrown at infrastructure security gears and too little time getting such gears to actually fit the people and contexts they are supposed to protect. Every freshman (freshwoman, if that term exists) knows about the weakest link in information security. If we know it, and we’ve known it for long enough, then, by design, it should no longer be an issue.

It’s very easy to sit in a comfortable chair and criticise one’s peers or colleagues. That’s not my remit here, I have profound respect for anyone who’s doing something. It’s equally vain to just shrug off and pretend that it can only happen to others. One day, you will eventually be the “other”. You feel for all those impacted by such a breach, although there are evidently far more important and painful issues in the world at the moment to be worrying about something like this particular breach of confidentiality.

This short essay is just a reminder, perhaps to myself as well, that if certain undesired technology issues don’t appear to be going away, we may not be approaching them the right way. Granted the news reporting isn’t always up to scratch, we do regularly learn that some very simple practices could have prevented the issues that get reported.